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Deceptive Appearances: Judges,
Cognitive Bias, and Dress Codes
By MARYBETH HERALD*
THERE WAS A TIME when bartending was considered men's work.1
Michigan even passed a law2 to ensure that the professional pouring
of alcohol remained a male-only occupation. When women chal-
lenged the restriction as a violation of equal protection principles, the
Supreme Court rebuffed the argument, applied the weak rational ba-
sis relationship standard of review, and pronounced the law as "not
without a basis in reason."3 Although the Court acknowledged a his-
torical role for "the alewife, sprightly and ribald,"4 a state's right to
ensure women would not be working in bars without adequate male
protection trumped even the female icons drawn from English literary
classics. 5
Several decades later, however, cases raising equal protection
challenges successfully punctured the underlying assumption that so-
cial and moral legislation could be grounded on gender stereotypes
* Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I would like to thank Ellen
Waldman, Julie Greenberg, and Joel Bergsma for their insightful comments and
suggestions, and my research assistant, Mary Stiles, for her excellent work.
1. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948) (allowing a ban on females working
as bartenders as the statute was within "the allowable legislative judgment" because work as
bartenders would create social and moral problems for females. In addition, "[t]he fact
that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerog-
atives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States
from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of
the liquor traffic.").
2. See id. at 465 (citing to Section 19a of Act 133 of the Public Acts of Michigan, 1945,
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.990(1) (Gum. Supp. 1947)).
3. Id. at 467.
4. Id. at 465 ("We are, to be sure, dealing with a historic calling. We meet the alewife,
sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare, but centuries before him she played a role in the
social life of England." (citing as an example JEAN JUSSERAND, ENGLISH WAYFARING LIFE IN
THE MIDDLE AGES, 133, 134, 136-37 (Barnes & Noble 1950) (1889))).
5. Id. at 466.
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alone. 6 In another case involving "the trafficking of liquor," the Court
applied the more demanding intermediate level of scrutiny to a state
rule allowing women to drink 3.2 percent beer at age eighteen, while
men were required to forgo such intoxicants until the more mature
age of twenty-one. 7 Suspicious of the "archaic and overbroad" general-
izations reflected in the law, this time the Court struck down the dif-
ferential as gender discrimination-largely because the state could
not sufficiently prove its link between young males and drunk driv-
ing.8 The Court detached "male" and "female" from their stereotypi-
cal attributes-reckless and responsible-and was left with little basis
for the law.9 The judgment that the state could not use sex classifica-
tions as automatic proxies for the possession of certain characteristics
seemed to be a signpost that we were on the road to gender equality.
Yet despite the Court's application of a higher standard of scru-
tiny and the passage of statutes, notably Title VII, 10 to combat gender
discrimination, the legal path to gender equality has been circuitous.
Efforts to expand the Equal Protection Clause's zone of legally as-
sured gender neutrality have sparked a judicial border war where ter-
ritory is claimed, only to be re-captured in a subsequent decision. 1 '
6. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("A [gender] classification 'must be reasona-
ble, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to that object of legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."' (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))).
7. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
8. Id. at 204.
9. Id. at 203 n.14 ("The very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-differential
laws . . . , are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative statistics.
Hence 'reckless' young men who drink and drive are transformed into arrest statistics,
whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home.") (citations omitted);
see also L.A. Dep't of Power & Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) ("Even a true
generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to
whom the generalization does not apply.").
10. 28 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
11. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (striking down prohi-
bition of entry of women into state's military academy and holding that equal protection
principles, as applied to gender classification, mean state actors may not rely on overbroad
generalizations about men and women), with Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 64-65 (2001)
(upholding a citizenship statute and holding that equal protection principles allow differ-
ential treatment of mothers and fathers, finding that "[i] n the case of a citizen mother and
a child born overseas, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen par-
ent and child inheres in the very event of birth," but more onerous requirements were
necessary for citizen fathers to "ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some
demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop.., a relationship ... that consists of the
real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent"). Although
the decision in Virginia seems to require an exceedingly persuasive justification for the
government to deviate from a gender-neutral standard, the Nguyen decision casually ac-
cepts-as exceedingly persuasive-the generalization that a woman automatically bonds
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Similarly, court decisions interpreting Title VII's gender neutralizing
language-prohibiting discrimination because of sex-adopt legal
constructions that sanction gender-biased practices already in place.12
For example, although no longer allowed to deny women the
right to work as bartenders simply because they are women, 13 an em-
ployer can legally demand that a female bartender conform to gen-
der-based appearance norms such as wearing lipstick, foundation,
mascara, and blush. 14 Although "his" and "hers" employment advertis-
ing is illegal, 15 once hired, employers can require workers to look
their gender roles in the course of non-gendered employment. Wo-
men may be fired, despite a stellar job performance, because they do
not meet their employer's standards, which are biased in favor of a
feminine appearance. The "alewife, sprightly and ribald" image of
Chaucer's and Shakespeare's eras has given way to a more nuanced
but still harmful stereotype.' 6 The mystery is why this required gender
role-playing is not considered discrimination on the basis of sex under
Title VII. The textual force of anti-discrimination laws has curb ap-
peal, but when subject to judicial interpretation, gender biases
emerge to mar the scenery.
Recent research indicates that the task of dismantling sex and
race discrimination in the workplace is more complicated than origi-
nally thought because the way we discriminate is complicated. Princi-
ples of psychology and sociology have enlightened us as to what we
actually do, rather than what we think we are doing, want to do, or
claim to be doing.1 7 For example, our normal developmental exploita-
with her child at birth, but that a man's commitment to his child is open to question until
proven.
12. But see Robert C. Post et al., Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Anti-Dis-
crimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (acknowledging the influence of underlying
social practices on court decisions but arguing that the "dominant conception of American
antidiscrimination law [which precludes acknowledging the legitimacy of gender norms],
distorts and masks the actual operation of that law, and by so doing, potentially under-
mines the law's coherence and usefulness as a tool of transformative social policy").
13. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
14. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
15. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389
(1973).
16. Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465.
17. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption for Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000)
[hereinafter Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science] (arguing that cognitive psychol-
ogy, sociology, and behavioral sciences provide a more nuanced understanding of human
behavior than the rationality assumption of law and economics); JeffreyJ. Rachlinkski, The
"New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L.
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tion of categories-stereotyping people and things-is an automati-
cally activated18 survival mechanism. 19 Well-worn neural pathways
silently control the ways we categorize, organize, and manage a contin-
uous flow of sensory information and efficiently handle complex deci-
sions. 20 Our stereotyping mechanism is not easily turned off, even
when we want to pull the plug on it, as in the case of gender biases.
Merely voicing support for gender equality is not transformative-our
brain's deeply-engrained habits do not respond on cue. To exacerbate
the situation, we often labor under misleadingly optimistic notions of
our decision-making capacity that hide these methodical mistakes. 21
Therefore we need to become aware of our stereotyping mechanism,
be motivated to correct it, and have sufficient control over our re-
sponses to correct them. 22
These automated cognitive systems can cause several types of
problems in the implementation of anti-discrimination law. On one
level, commentators have pointed out the shortcomings of the legal
system for Title VII plaintiffs in remedying gender and race discrimi-
REV. 739 (2000) (discussing the use of behavioral decision theory ("BDT") by psychologists
in studying jury decisions and other areas of law where recent developments by behavioral
economists have developed more accurate theories on how people react to law); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed. 2000) (arguing that in the
past two decades, social scientists have developed an understanding of how people actually,
not merely as is perceived, make decisions).
18. See TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UN-
CONSCIOUS 52-53 (2002) [hereinafter WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES].
19. We are cautious, for example, when confronting sharp objects and unfamiliar ani-
mals because we have learned that those categories are associated with danger. See Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163-64 (1995) [hereinafter Krie-
ger, The Content of Our Categories].
20. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in AMos TERSKY ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 20
(Cambridge 1982) (describing heuristics of representativeness, availability, and anchoring
that influence decision making and "are highly economical and usually effective, but they
lead to systematic and predictable errors"); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science,
supra note 17, at 1143 ("People are boundedly rational. To save time, avoid complexity,
and generally make dealing with the challenges of daily life tractable, actors often adopt
decision strategies or employ heuristics that lead to decisions that fail to maximize their
utility.").
21. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confi-
dence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 411-412 (1992) [hereinafter Griffin & Tversky, The
Weighing of Evidence] ("One of the major findings that has emerged from this research is
that people are often more confident in their judgments than is warranted by the facts.").
22. See generally Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar & Nancy Brekke, Mental Con-
tamination and the Debiasing Problem, in THOMAS GILOVICH, DALE W. GRIFFIN & DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 185 (2002)
(discussing the difficulty of reducing bias in human judgment).
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nation because discrimination is often the product of employers's em-
bedded biases, as opposed to conscious action, leaving the pernicious
effects of discrimination difficult to prove and unable to be remedied
under current law.23
A similar problem exists on a larger scale, however, because the
legal system depends on judicial interpretation of the laws. Judges are
not immune from decision-making biases that afflict humans gener-
ally,2 4 and cognitive biases may guide interpretations of the law.2 5 For
example, because of a predisposition toward preserving the status
quo, judicial interpretations of anti-discrimination laws may keep us
close to our starting positions despite legislative directives to the con-
trary.26 Moreover, to the extent thatjudges might consider themselves
experts in the law, they are probably more confident of their abilities
to disregard biases than they should be. 27 Indeed, lawyers and litigants
in the legal system have every incentive to prey on the biases of the
judiciary to sway the decisions in their favor.28 Accordingly, judicial
alertness to cognitive biases, including judges's own and those of the
participants in their courtroom, becomes even more important. Cog-
nitive illusions in the gender arena are especially pernicious because,
23. See, e.g., Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 19; Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005).
24. The invisible hand of cognitive bias (in the form of anchoring, framing, egocentr-
ism, and hindsight biases, as well as the influence of the representative heuristic) showed
up in a study of one hundred and sixty-seven federal magistrates. See Chris Guthrie et al.,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 784 (2001); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges
Think About Risk?, 1 Am. L. & ECON. Rv. 26, 50-51 (1999); see also AndrewJ. Wistrich, Chris
Guthrie & Jeffrey Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Delib-
erately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1291 (2005) (noting that the study of judges
showed influence of anchoring, but not hindsight bias, and discussing generally the influ-
ence of inadmissible evidence on judges).
25. See Guthrie et al., supra note 24, at 781; Viscusi, supra note 24, at 27 (discussing the
hindsight bias effect on judges's decisions); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gu-
lati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb
in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORy L.J. 83, 85-86 (2002) ("Thinking seriously about doc-
trinal heuristics . . . requires a new model of judicial] adjudication that refrains from
heroic assumptions about the judicial decisionmaking process.").
26. See Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 19, at 1164-66. See generally
Gary Blasi &John T. Jost, System justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal
Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1119 (2006) [hereinafter Blasi & Jost, System
Justification Theory and Research] (discussing human motivation to justify the status quo even
when disadvantaged by it).
27. See Griffin & Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence, supra note 21.
28. See Blasi & Jost, System Justification Theory and Research, supra note 26, at 1151-52
("Although courts and commentators may disfavor explicit efforts to arouse group justifica-
tion motives, group-based stereotypes and bias, whether implicit or explicit, are always at
work in the courtroom.").
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in reinforcing the status quo, they fortify barriers to equality.29 If we
are to progress, we must develop reliable adaptations and limit poor
choices.30
Part I briefly explores some common cognitive biases that con-
tribute to the intractability of gender discrimination. Part II discusses
those biases in the context of cases involving gender-based appear-
ance codes. It discusses the need for increasing our understanding of
the biases that affect our decision making, particularly judicial deci-
sion making. It is important to bring these processes to the surface
and debate them honestly, rather than allow them to surreptitiously
infiltrate the legal system.31 Judges, holding the titular role as impar-
tial arbiters in the legal system, must exercise their authority, con-
scious that they are subject to cognitive biases and alert to thwarting,
where possible, its undermining of the goals of gender equality.
I. Cognitive Bias
Our brain operates according to the embedded marching orders
that have served it well in the past. We rely on mental short cuts,
known as heuristics, to help us navigate quickly through the swamps
of information we encounter in daily life.3 2 These habitual rules guide
us in decision making, privileging some information while rejecting or
neglecting other information. But our internal operating systems,
helpful in making quick judgments in the maze of everyday life, may
not achieve rational or desired results in all situations. For example,
we tend to rely on information that is available to our recall, although
that information may not be representative of reality. The "availabil-
ity" heuristic33 may lead us to think that a terror attack is the biggest
threat to our safety, when the risk of a heart attack may be far more
29. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. Ray. 2541, 2545, 2568 (1994) (propos-
ing standard to determine whether appearance requirements disadvantage women).
30. See, e.g., Baruch Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 422 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982).
31. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correc-
tion: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117-42
(1994) [hereinafter Wilson & Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction].
32. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in Amos TvERSKV ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Cambridge 1982); Eldar Sharif & Robyn A. LaBouef, Rationality, 2002 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.,
Jan. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 9106451, at 491.
33. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic forJudging Frequency and
Probability, in AMos TvERSKV ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
163-64 (Cambridge 1982).
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likely. The former is "salient" to us (another heuristic) and vivid
through news events while the latter may be hidden from attention.3 4
Although there are a variety of cognitive biases that contribute to the
entrenchment of gender discrimination, this Article will discuss three
specific ones: (1) the status quo bias, (2) the representative heuristic,
and (3) framing. Specifically, these biases contribute to judicial inter-
pretations of Title VII that undermine its goal of equal employment
opportunities.
A. Status Quo Bias
When we make judgments, we tend to overvalue our present posi-
tion and worry about the uncertainties and potential misfortune that
might befall us if we make changes. 35 All things being equal, humans
tend to place more value on a good they possess or the position that
they presently occupy. 36 Known as the "endowment effect" or "status
quo bias,"'3 7 this "bird in the hand" bias is closely related to humans'
loss-averse nature.38 Studies confirm that, when in doubt, the brain
defaults into stay-the-course mode. 39 Certainly, there are excellent rea-
sons to be cautious in life when catastrophe could loom, but the disad-
vantage of this unconscious caution is that our brains often intuitively
refuse to budge from existing coordinates when movement is neces-
sary. Accordingly, we erroneously overvalue our present position sim-
ply because it is our present position and not because it is the better
option.4
0
34. SeeJohn B. Pryor & Mitchell Kriss, The Cognitive Dynamics of Salience in the Attribu-
tion Process, 35J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 49, 49-50 (1977).
35. Daniel Kahnemann et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199-203 (1991); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 625-30 (1998).
36. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv.
1227, 1228-29 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin, The Endowment Effect] (explaining that the
.status quo bias" refers to an individual's tendency "to prefer the present state of the world
to alternative states, all other things being equal" and citing, as an example, Williams Sam-
uelson & Richard Zechhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTrY 7
(1988)).
37. Id. at 1228-29.
38. Id. at 1250 ("Assuming that people feel entitled to the status quo state of the world
in the same way that they feel entitled to goods or rights to which they have a legally
cognizable ownership interest, loss aversion is also consistent with the results of studies that
show a status quo bias.").
39. Id. at 1232-36 (discussing studies).
40. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant:
Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in THOMAS GILOVICH, DALE W. GRIFFIN & DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120, 120-38
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (discussing the concept of anchoring and noting that it
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When courts interpret laws, the judges' status quo bias may un-
dermine the implementation of laws dictating change. For example,
Title VII powered reforms for gender equality by outlawing discrimi-
nation because of sex in employment practices. 41 Nevertheless,
through creative rationalizations, courts treat sex specific appearance
codes as a special category of workplace rules, creating a loophole for
gender-based discrimination. A preference for the comfort of the fa-
miliar heavily influences a reading of the law that is at odds with its
language and purpose.
B. The Representative Heuristic-the Process of Categorization
We sort the abundance of information that we receive each day
by schema and category.42 Our brain receives information quickly, us-
ing a series of scripts and themes, allowing us to filter the information
rapidly into "discard" and "keep" piles. We assess things based on
whether they tend to be like or not like a category of items.43 When
one thing resembles something else in a category, we judge the possi-
bility that the first item is a member of that category as high. If there is
no resemblance to the second item, we judge the likelihood as less.
This process is known as the representative heuristic. 44 Once our
brain places an item in a category, it also attaches other known charac-
teristics of the category to that item.45 Much of this categorizing is a
form of automated stereotyping and is so mechanical we do not notice
it.46 Efficient it may be, but flawless it is not.
Our categorization may be overbroad or inaccurate, resulting in
the trashing of treasures and the treasuring of trash. For example, we
may miss a good movie because we associate a particular film star with
"appears to be both prevalent and robust[, and the] contaminating effects of irrelevant
anchors can be observed in numerous real-world contexts").
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2006).
42. SUSAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, Soc. COGNITION 97-99, 136-39 (2d ed.
1991).
43. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and ly Representativeness, in Amos
TVERSKY ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 84 (Cambridge
1982).
44. See WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES, supra note 18, at 4-11.
45. This mental shortcut is known as the representative heuristic. Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in AMos TERSKY ET AL., JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84 (Cambridge 1982).
46. See Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION,
27-28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978) ("Since no organism can cope with
infinite diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the
environment into classifications by which nonidentical stimuli can be treated as
equivalent.").
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mediocrity, ignore an excellent book or article because we do not rec-
ognize the author, or be disappointed with a five-star restaurant be-
cause the meal did not include some of our favorite foods. When
books, film, and food are involved, the consequences are small. When
race and gender are involved, our stereotyping has effects that are
more pernicious.
Our mind works out a complex series of rules and modes of oper-
ation that elude even those in the forefront of neural research. 47 Be-
cause our categorization system is often broad and imprecise, it can
lead us to the wrong conclusions while our categorization system's
subliminal operation allows these mistakes to escape our attention.4 3
What we can tell, however, is that our brain is surprisingly adept at
making biased judgments. We learn complex rules of association both
implicitly and quickly, yet we are not able to recognize that we learned
the rule or even articulate the principles involved within the rule. 49
Even more important, these artificially induced biases take on a life of
their own by repeating themselves and becoming self-perpetuating.50
With regard to gender-based appearance rules, the social science evi-
dence suggests they set us up for prejudicial judgments. Examining
the social science literature, even when contested, gives courts the op-
portunity to test their intuitive-and unjustified-findings that
gendered dress is unrelated to equal employment opportunities.
47. See generally Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics:
How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, 28J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 9-64 (2005) (discussing
the potential for the tool of neuroscience to inform economic models of human behavior).
48. Id. at 11 ("Because people have little or no introspective access to [the brain's
automatic] processes, or volitional control over them, and these processes evolved to solve
problems of evolutionary importance rather than respect logical dicta, the behavior these
processes generate need not follow normative axioms of inference and choice.").
49. See WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES, supra note 18, at 26-27 (discussing
experiment).
50. See Pawel Lewicki, Thomas Hill & Maria Czyzewska, Nonconscious Acquisition of In-
formation, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 796-801 (1992). Known as the "Pygmalion effect," the
most famous studies of this phenomenon involve teacher and student expectations of stu-
dent performance, finding the higher the expectation, regardless of the baseline diagnos-
tic information, the higher the student performance. See also ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE
JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENT (1968); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual
Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997). See generally ScoTr PLOUS, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 234-35 (1993).
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C. Framing Answers in the Form of a Question
We are vulnerable to how our choices are described.51 Studies
confirm that people will view the same problem differently depending
on how it is stated. 52 For example, people are more likely to undergo
a risky medical procedure if they are told, "ninety percent [of people
who undergo this procedure] are alive in five years" than if they are
told, "ten percent [of people] are dead after five years." 53 In the pre-
ceding example, the first choice is cast as a gain, and the second is cast
as a loss, which makes all the difference in preferences. The lesson is
that we may manipulate preferences based on the question we ask be-
cause we can appeal to underlying biases.
Consider the advertiser's use of the phrase "96 [percent] fat-
free." 54 Designed to capitalize on the current craze for healthy foods,
the advertising frame is effective but deceptive. 55 If the food has four
percent fat, it is not fat-free, but it will trigger a "healthy" frame of
reference for the potential buyer, even though the whole milk sitting
on the shelf next to it with the label "contains 4 [percent] fat" will not
trigger the same healthy-buyer instincts.
Although much of our thinking processes may be reflexive, the
framing game is one that judges,5 6 lawyers, politicians, businesses, ad-
vertisers, and interest groups understand. 57 For judges, what is impor-
tant is to: (1) understand the framing bias and not be misled by it
51. See Richard R. Lau & Mark Schlesinger, Policy Frames, Metaphorical Reasoning, and
Support for Public Policies, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 77, 80 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psycho-
logy of Choice, 211 Sci. 453-58 (1981).
53. See Cass Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1590
(2004).
54. SeeJon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1451 (1999) ("One way in which an adroit
marketer can influence the buyer's perception is through the use of framing effects, which
refer to the tendency for information format (as opposed to content) to influence percep-
tions and behavior. Manufacturers of food products, for instance, have learned that label-
ing a food product seventy-five percent non-fat instead of twenty-five percent fat can greatly
increase sales.").
55. Id. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNow YOUR VAL-
UES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004) (discussing effective use of frames in political
discourse).
56. See Guthrie et al., supra note 24, at 822-26 (noting that judges are generally sus-
ceptible to cognitive illusions but less susceptible to framing effects).
57. See id. Although judges are prone to the same cognitive biases as the general pop-
ulation, they seem to be less prone to the framing bias. See id. at 822-23. The art of framing
is one that lawyers have expertise in, so this may explain the ability to recognize a frame, as
well as the ability to manipulate the bias.
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when lawyers present arguments, and (2) resist the use of deceptive
frames to defend policies in their decisions.
Examples of the use of misleading frames in judicial decisions
abound. 58 The Supreme Court has characterized the denial of preg-
nancy benefits as a policy distinguishing between pregnant and non-
pregnant persons,59 thus distracting from the gender bias inherent in a
policy that denies benefits to a class composed exclusively of women.
Another court claimed a lack of gender discrimination in a "no
breastfeeding" policy because no one could breastfeed-male or fe-
male. 60 This method of framing highlights that the policy applies
equally to everyone, appealing to a value in equality, while concealing
the inequality that only women will be impacted by it. This frame per-
petuates biased preferences by casting the question in terms that are
facially gender-neutral. Similarly, when courts consider workplace
dress codes, creative framing can mask inequality by emphasizing that
a dress code exists for all workers, even though it differs for each sex.
For example, although a particular policy split into separate and dis-
tinct male and female grooming requirements, a court emphasized
that, overall, there was "an appearance policy that applied to both
male and female" and "[it] was aimed at creating a professional and
very similar look for all." 6 1 Of course, the details reveal quite dissimilar
requirements, just as ninety-six percent fat free milk has quite a lot of
fat in it, but the bias has been cast.
58. The framing of the substantive due process case as presenting the question of
whether there is a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy was pivotal in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986). The question posed in Bowers v. Hardwick, which
considered the constitutionality of a criminal sodomy statute, was whether the nation's
history and tradition reflected a pattern of protection for the right to engage in consensual
homosexual sodomy. The answer was no. Id. at 192. Almost twenty years later, in Lawrence
v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered a similar statute and substantive due process chal-
lenge. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). This time, the Court focused on whether same-sex intercourse
fell within that sphere of private activity that was constitutionally immune from state inter-
ference. Id. at 569-71. The answer was yes. Id. at 578.
59. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) ("[I] t does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . ").
60. See Derungs v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that,
under both an Ohio statute and Title VII, a store's ban on breast-feeding in public areas is
not discrimination based on sex where there is no comparable class of males treated more
favorably with regard to breastfeeding).
61. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
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II. Cognitive Bias at Work
A. Status Quo Bias, Title VII, and Appearance Codes
The influence of the status quo bias is evident when courts con-
sider gender-based grooming codes in the workplace. Since Title VII's
enactment, lower courts have shied away from interpretations of the
statutory language that would cover general appearance policies that
establish different rules for males and females. 62 Although the courts
give lip service to Title VII's policy of equal employment opportuni-
ties, the courts artificially limit the reach of the statute.63 This court-
imposed limitation on Title VII is missing from both the literalism of
the text and the legislative history of Title V1164 ; instead, it reflects a
predilection to maintain the status quo. 65 The legislative success in
accomplishing gender equality depends upon the courts's ability to
read the statutory mandate free from the anchor of their own
gendered pasts. The consequences of change are for the legislature to
sort out.
The basic language of Title VII is straightforward. Title VII pro-
hibits employer discrimination "against any individual with respect to
his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment... because of such individual's.., sex."' 66 Title VII contains one
major exception-the bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ"), which allows employers to prove that they must use sex as a
qualification when "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
62. See infta notes 83-98.
63. See generally Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should
Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 665, 680 (1999) (explaining that gender stereotyping has descriptive and prescriptive
components, and "the prescriptive component of gender stereotypes may function to bol-
ster or maintain the existing social structure by rewarding women who conform to tradi-
tional gender roles and sanctioning women (and men) who violate those prescriptions").
64. Of course, legislative intent related to sex discrimination is lacking because the
amendment adding "sex" to Title VII was done on one day's notice, with little floor discus-
sion. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971); Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARv. L. Rv. 1109, 1167 (1971). See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243
n.9 (1989) ("The somewhat bizarre path by which 'sex' came to be included as a forbidden
criterion for employment-it was included in an attempt to defeat the bill, see C. & B.
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIWL RIGHTS Acr
115-17 (1985)-does not persuade us that the legislators' statements pertaining to race
are irrelevant to cases alleging gender discrimination.").
65. See generally Blasi & Jost, System Justification Thery and Research, supra note 26 (dis-
cussing human motivation to justify the status quo even when disadvantaged by it).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
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that particular business or enterprise. ' 67 The statutory exception of
the BFOQ defense, even if it is applicable to employer decisions be-
yond hiring and employment, 68 would seem to be the logical basis for
resting gender-based business requirements, and it places an eviden-
tiary burden on employers. One needs to prove the requirements are
essential to the job and that the qualifications are sufficiently related
to the essence of the business. 69
The actual operation of Title VII, when filtered through the judi-
cial system, is less than straightforward in the case of grooming and
appearance standards. Consider, for example, the case of Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Company, Inc.,70 where the employer imposed differ-
ent grooming requirements for men and women. Harrah's policy de-
manded that female employees: keep their hair worn down, as well as
"teased, curled, or styled" 71; wear particularly colored nail polish and
stockings; apply face powder, as well as blush and mascara; and finally,
wear "[I]ip color . . .at all times. '' 2 The policy only required male
employees to maintain short and trimmed nails and hair, and abstain
from wearing nail polish or make-up.73
Jespersen, an "exemplary" bartender for twenty years at Har-
rah's,7 4 claimed that requiring women bartenders to wear make-up
facially violated the no discrimination "because of ... sex" proscrip-
tion of Title VII. 75 The text supportsJespersen's argument, and noth-
ing in the limited legislative history refutes that interpretation of the
language of the statute; nor does the BFOQ defense help in these
circumstances.7 6 In the case of sex-based grooming requirements, and
67. Id. ("[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise. . . ."). See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2006) (EEOC guidelines provide BFOQ cannot be
established based on abilities and attributes of the sexes or preferences of coworkers or
customers).
68. See David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEv. L.J.
240, 244 (2004) (arguing that the BFOQ"[b]y rather ordinary principles of statutory inter-
pretation, this limited allowance for sex-, religion-, and national origin-based discrimina-
tion never extends to sex discriminatory dress codes").
69. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201-02 (1991).
70. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
71. Id. at 1107.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1106-07.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2006).
76. The "BFOQ" which would involve the employer showing that make-up was a nec-
essary adjunct of the job of selling alcohol at Harrah's, never became a conscious issue in
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more specifically a women only make-up policy, the primary business
must be sexual titillation; the business cannot simply be using sex to
sell to slip in under the BFOQ exception. 77 For example, a casino like
Harrah's would be required to prove that wearing make-up affected
the ability to serve alcoholic drinks or come out and claim that sexual-
ity was part of what they were selling-a failed defense even in the
case of the Hooters's girls.7 8 Nonetheless, courts have rejected that
defense in the case of airline employees because their primary job is
the Jespersen's en banc opinion. Customer preference is not a valid basis for a BFOQ.
Rather, a BFOQ must relate to performance of the job. It is a very narrow exception to the
statute. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). Title VII suggests that "permis-
sible distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the job."
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991). Of course, if a
business states that it is selling sexual entertainment, for example, a Playboy Bunny Club, it
is more likely to get away with appearance requirements and gender-based ones as well. See
St. Cross v. Playboy Club of N.Y., Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 (N.Y. Human
Rights App. Bd. 1971) (upholding appearance requirements where the primary purpose
was "to titillate and entice male customers"). The question, therefore, becomes whether
the employer is willing to make that claim in some cases. Harrah's, located in the female
sexualized atmosphere of Reno, was not required under the Ninth Circuit's case law to
make that showing, although it did claim it was entitled to a BFOQ. See Appellee's Answer-
ing Brief at 33-34, Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.
2004), rehg granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), affd, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
77. See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Per-
missible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REv. 148, 148 (2004) (discussing courts's unwillingness
to allow BFOQs when employers seek to sexualize "mainstream," as opposed to sex jobs).
78. See generally id. at 204 (explaining how Hooters Air's deliberate marketing may
make their sexual dress code less problematic). Hooters requires that its female employees
wear sexually-revealing attire. The EEOC actually did not agree with Hooters's argument
that its business was sexual recreation, as opposed to serving food, and that required the
hiring of "Hooters' girls." Nevertheless, a settlement allowed Hooters to continue its sexual
escapades as long as it created some gender-neutral positions, presumably Hooters's per-
sons. CompareJoshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment: Can It Sup-
port a Hostile Work Environment Claim By a Nude Dancer, 24 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
271, 291-96 n.122 (1998) (arguing for Title VII coverage for sexual harassment claims for
persons in sex related jobs and discussing Hooters litigation), with Kelly Ann Cahill, Hoot-
ers: Should There Be An Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1995) (proposing assumption of the risk theory
for sexual harassment claims of women who work in highly sexualized environments such
as Hooters).
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to transport passengers safely,79 and in the case of at least one restau-
rant, because the job of servers is to serve food.80
The plaintiff in Jespersen lost, however, because judicial authority
excludes gender-based appearance and grooming codes from Title
VII coverage. 81 In the Jespersen en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit
noted at the beginning of its analysis "[t]he settled law in this cir-
cuit.., does not support.., that a sex-based difference in appearance
standards alone, without any further showing of disparate effects, cre-
ates a prima facie case."82 In other words, one needs to show more
than facial, sex-based discrimination to show sex discrimination in ap-
pearance policies.
Courts have used various rationales to exclude statutory coverage
for appearance codes.8 3 The courts found that they were too trivial to
employment opportunities or too important to employers for Con-
gress to have included them under Title VII.8 4 Despite a varied ap-
79. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (noting that "in
jobs where sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary service provided, e.g., a social
escort or topless dancer, the job automatically calls for one sex exclusively"). See also Diaz v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting BFOQ defense
for hiring only female flight attendants noting that "[w]hile a pleasant environment, en-
hanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that female stewardesses provide as well as, accord-
ing to the finding of the trial court, their apparent ability to perform the non-mechanical
functions of the job in a more effective manner than most men, may all be important, they
are tangential to the essence of the business involved"); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653
F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the argument that a "stereotyped customer pref-
erence" fit qualified as a BFOQ).
80. Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937
(App. Div. 1974).
81. The highly sexualized atmosphere of the Reno casinos never officially made any
legal difference to Jespersen's case. See Yuracko, supra note 77, at 149 (discussing the
BFOQ defense generally where employers claim a "particular type of sexual titillation for
their customers"). See generally Ann McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VI1
to Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (2006) (discussing the application of Title
VII to women working in sexualized industries, specifically as blackjack dealers, casino
cocktail waitresses, exotic dancers, and brothel prostitutes).
82. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
83. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding Title VII does not cover separate sex hair length policies because hair length is
not immutable). See also Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("Tide VII never was intended to encompass sexual classifications having only an insignifi-
cant effect on employment opportunities."); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753,
755 (9th Cir. 1977) (dress code requiring men to wear a necktie was not gender discrimi-
nation covered by Title VII). But see Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661,
666 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (explaining that the EEOC's original position was that Title VII pro-
hibited sex specific appearance standards).
84. See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEw EN.. L.
REv. 1395, 1401 (1992) ("There is, on the one hand, a tendency to denigrate and demean
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proach, the courts managed uniformly to place centuries of gender-
based appearance rules safely outside the grasp of Title VII. Rather
than seeing an anti-bias law as a tool to de-bias the law governing ap-
pearance codes, the court re-framed the codes as neutral and main-
tained the status quo.8 5 What results is an unexamined activism on the
part of the judiciary as judges's interpretations undermine the for-
ward marching orders of the law.
Given the lack of text or history to support the result, the courts
considering the issue rested mainly on their intuition.8 6 For example,
one court, engaging in guesswork more than a realistic assessment of
the statutory language, noted, "Congress in all probability did not in-
tend for its proscription of sexual discrimination to have significant
and sweeping implications. ''87 Thus, employees could be "screened
with respect to a neutral fact, i.e., grooming in accordance with gener-
ally accepted community standards of dress and appearance. 88
Gendered dressing standards, however, are not neutral, nor are com-
munity standards appropriate when they contravene them.89
The courts also emphasized a perceived lack of connection be-
tween appearance codes and employment opportunities. 90 Claiming
that the gendered codes had a trivial effect on employment opportu-
nities, courts found challenges to gender-based grooming standards
appearance claims, a faint suggestion that courts have better things to do with their time
than adjudicate grooming standards. Suddenly, the tone becomes somber ... when judges
get to the part of their opinion where they uphold, as they usually do, the power of employ-
ers.., to visit severe penalties on people who wear nonconforming dress or hairstyles....
J] udges create a peculiar dissonance by trivializing appearance claims while at the same
time asserting the need for the authorities to possess vast powers to enforce conventional
attitudes and prejudices.").
85. See Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199
(2006).
86. Indeed, one commentator asserts that desiring courts to pay less attention to gen-
der norms is a lost cause. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American An-
tidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. Rv. 1, 30 (2000) (arguing that "[w]e can be certain,
however, that to the extent that gender remains a culturally inescapable fact, it also will
remain inextricably present in the application of Title VII").
87. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090.
88. Id. at 1092.
89. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that taking into account
community racial biases in making a custody decision violated equal protection guarantees
because "private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect").
90. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) ("Employer
grooming codes requiring different hair lengths for men and women bear such a negligi-
ble relation to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude they were a target of the
Act.").
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not within the purview of Title VI1. 9 1 For example, one court, consid-
ering a challenge to men's hair length requirements, opined that hair
length "is related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run
a business than to ensure equality of employment opportunity."92 The
court's statement is based on unidentified assumptions about the na-
ture of equal employment opportunity. Thus a categorical legal rule is
born of deeply engrained and unexamined belief. Yet its arrival in the
form of neutral statutory interpretation obfuscates the reality of the
biased decision making at work.9 3 As noted below, the courts's intui-
tion that the codes do not affect employment opportunities and con-
ditions of employment is wrong.9 4 Thus, gender-based social norms-
often the cause of problems that Title VII was meant to address-were
grandfathered into Title VII by a judicial reading that privileged gen-
der-based traditions.95 The courts substituted (biased) gut instinct for
analysis, overly identifying with employers and the status quo. For ex-
ample, one court, identifying with the employer's desire to cater to
entrenched social norms, noted:
Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a com-
pany's place in public estimation. That the image created by its
employees dealing with the public when on company assignment
affects its relations is so well known that we may take judicial notice
of the employer's proper desire to achieve favorable acceptance.
96
91. SeeJONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 195 (3d ed. 2000) ("People tend
not to look for evidence against what they favor, and, when they find it anyway, they tend to
ignore it.").
92. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090. See also Earwood v. Cont'l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d
1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[D]iscrimination based on factors of personal preference
does not necessarily restrict employment opportunities and thus is not forbidden."); Knott
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Where, as here, such [personal
grooming] policies are reasonable and are imposed in an evenhanded manner on all em-
ployees, slight differences in the appearance requirements for males and females have only
a negligible effect on employment opportunities.").
93. See generally Bartlett, supra note 29, at 2558 ("The real problem with the assump-
tions courts make about the trivial impact of dress and appearance requirements on em-
ployees and their importance to employers . . . is that they rely on unexamined, culture-
bound judgments that will tend to reinforce existing, hidden prejudices and stereotypes.").
94. See discussion infra notes 136-149. The infiltration of personal judgment into
"neutral" statutory interpretation also appears when the courts begin judging whether
dress requirements place an "unequal burden" on women. See discussion and notes infra
notes 109-111.
95. See Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(" [R] easonable regulations prescribing good grooming standards are not at all uncommon
in the business world, indeed, taking account of basic differences in male and female phy-
siques and common differences in customary dress of male and female employees, it is not
usually thought there is unlawful discrimination 'because of sex."'). Two examples of gen-
der-based traditions include high-heeled shoes for women and no earrings for men. Id.
96. Id. at 1124-25 (emphasis added).
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Courts that tried to create a theory to justify the results distin-
guished "mutable" from "immutable" characteristics.97 Although cre-
ating less than a wholesale exception for appearance codes from Title
VII coverage, this theoretical framework was still unhooked from the
language and goals of Title VII. The theory was that if the employee
has the ability to change the characteristic (such as hair length), then
the employer is permitted more leniency to enact policies that dis-
criminate on the basis of this characteristic. In contrast, if the charac-
teristic in question is immutable (such as breast size), then the
employer may not discriminate on the basis of that characteristic.
These decisions are misguided attempts to compromise the language
of Title VII where no reference to "mutability" exists.98 Nor does mu-
tability have anything to do with Title VII's goal of equal employment
opportunities. If an employer requires women to wear long nails and
men short nails, Title VII's stated goal of prohibiting discrimination
because of sex in conditions of employment is implicated whether the
employer is imposing the gender-based rules on mutable or immuta-
ble body parts.
As the case law developed, courts began to awaken to some of the
problems that gender-based appearance codes cause. For example,
cases involving dual-weight policies for flight attendants caused stir-
rings of understanding of the effect of dual-appearance polices.on em-
ployment and employment opportunities.99 Nevertheless, having
exempted all appearance and grooming standards from Title VII, the
courts had to backpedal to grant relief under Title VII. Rather than
recognizing that the original rule exempting appearance and groom-
ing standards was unwarranted and unwise, courts instead jury-rigged
various rules to patch the problem. In so doing, courts have only exac-
97. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1974). See also
Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973);Jahns v. Mo. Pac. R.R.
Co., 391 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mo. 1975).
98. Commentators noted the weaknesses of the "mutability" distinction. See generally
Bartlett, supra note 29, at 2558-61 (criticizing the failure of courts to recognize that while
dress and appearance are mutable, they are still critical to self-worth and dignity); Peter
Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 769, 838-89 (1987) (arguing that mutable and immutable distinction
should be "meaningless" under Title VII).
99. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The uncontro-
verted evidence shows that United chose weight maximums for women that generally cor-
responded to the medium frame category of MetLife's Height and Weight Tables. By
contrast, the maximums for men generally corresponded to MetLife's large frame cate-
gory .... Because of this consistent difference in treatment of women and men, we con-
clude that United's weight policy between 1980 and 1994 was facially discriminatory.").
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erbated the problem by starting with an approach that sanctioned
gender-biased distinctions.
One example is the development of the "unequal burdens" test
by the Ninth Circuit in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc.100 Gerdom
involved dual-weight standards for male and female employees in the
airline industry. 10' The distinguishing factor to the court was that dif-
ferential gender standards in the other cases imposed no greater bur-
den of compliance on either sex but, with regard to the weight issue,
women faced a greater burden of compliance. The Ninth Circuit
therefore announced that under Title VII "[a] sex differentiated ap-
pearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women is
disparate treatment."'0 2 Imposing appearance rules on one sex only
would violate Title VII. 10° Striking down the airlines's weight policy,
the Gerdom court said that employee appearance standards must be
"evenhandedly applied to employees of both sexes. '1 0 4
The new "unequal burdens" test was unsatisfactory from the start,
beginning with the misleading implication that equal burdens were
even achievable objectives. Apparently unfazed by the disastrous his-
torical record of a "separate but equal" rule, the Ninth Circuit
plunged gender down the road where race no longer would tread.10 5
The unequal burdens test is problematic for three different rea-
sons.' 0 6 First, it sanctions employer-imposed gender distinctions in
dress requirements in violation of the language of Title VII, thus per-
petuating gender stereotyping. If employers can require an em-
ployee's appearance to mimic gender norms, which are inherently
unequal, they perpetuate discrimination. 10 7
Second, it skews the rules to place the burden on those challeng-
ing appearance policies, contradicting Title VII's statutory design that
100. 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).
101. Id. at 603.
102. Frank, 216 F.3d at 855 (emphasis added).
103. Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 607.
104. Id. at 606.
105. Id. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down
"separate but equal" school assignments based on race because "separate but equal is in-
herently unequal"); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (holding that separate but
equal facilities were constitutional and if they bore "a badge of inferiority," it was "solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it").
106. Because of these problems, attempts to shore up the test by incorporating job-
relatedness will not solve the underlying problem. Cf Megan Kelly, Making-up Conditions of
Employment: The Unequal Burdens Test as a Flawed Mode of Analysis inJespersen v. Harrah's
Operating Co., Inc., 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 45, 63-67 (2006) (stating thatjob-related-
ness should be incorporated in the test).
107. See generally Bartlett, supra note 29, at 2558.
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placed the burden for BFOQs on the employer, a presumption of gen-
der neutrality unless otherwise justified by the employer. Instead of
applying the BFOQ exception, the courts have created a special ex-
emption that requires the employee to show that the appearance pol-
icy imposes an unequal burden on men and women, that the policy is
motivated by discriminatory purposes, or that the policy relates to an
immutable characteristic. This scheme weights the scales in favor of
the employer and the status quo by allocating to the challenger the
difficult burden of showing that the appearance policy is not in line
with "community norms."108 For example, saddlingJespersen with this
burden allowed the court to carp that Jespersen presented no evi-
dence that "Harrah's motivation was to stereotype the women bar-
tenders." 109 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit majority opinion claimed the
need to see and hear evidence "that it costs more money and takes
more time for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement than
it takes for a man to comply with the requirement that he keep his
hair short."110 Setting aside the stubborn refusal to acknowledge that
putting on and maintaining make-up is more burdensome than not
wearing make-up, a' the larger problem is the burden shifting that
108. See generally Blasi & Jost, System Justification Theory and Research, supra note 26
(describing the theory of "system justification" behavior or motivation of humans to justify
the social status quo even when victimized by it); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in
Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv.
1583, 1584 (1998) (discussing powerful effect of status quo bias in contract negotiations).
109. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc). The opinion faults the plaintiff for complaining that she does not like make-up
without providing any proof that applying daily make-up is a more onerous burden than
not applying daily make-up or complying with a monthly haircutting chore:
Jespersen asks us to take judicial notice of the fact that it costs more money and
takes more time for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement than it
takes for a man to comply with the requirement that he keep his hair short, but
these are not matters appropriate for judicial notice. Judicial notice is reserved
for matters "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court"
or "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accu-
racy cannot reasonably be questioned." . . . As a result, we would have to speculate
about those issues in order to then guess whether the policy creates unequal bur-
dens for women. This would not be appropriate.
Id. at 1110. Such a conclusion is especially ironic, considering the courts took judicial no-
tice of the fact that Congress did not want appearance and dress codes to be covered under
Title VII. See supra note 96.
110. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
111. Judge Kozinski's dissent reasoned:
I find it perfectly clear that Harrah's overall grooming policy is substantially more
burdensome for women than for men. Every requirement that forces men to
spend time or money on their appearance has a corresponding requirement that
is as, or more, burdensome for women: short hair v. "teased, curled, or styled"
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favors the status quo. The employer is not required tojustify a gender-
based policy; the employee must justify a gender-neutral policy.
Third, this ill-defined test of unequal burdens requires courts to
balance the costs of gender-biased rules against each other, approving
gender-biased work requirements as long as they are matched against
equally gender-biased requirements. Equating mascara and teased
hair with short hair and short nails reinforces gender stereotyping and
does not tally up to gender equity. If one does the math, one gender-
based burden on females added to one gender-based burden on
males equals two gender-based employment burdens.
The results of these court decisions, inconsistent though they
may be in reasoning, are consistent with the status quo bias. The
courts are required to trade the certainty of accepted gender stan-
dards for the uncertainty of a requirement that employers demon-
strate the need for those gender discriminatory policies." 2 The bias
may be even stronger as employers paint the alternative to gendered
guidelines in horror-story terms. In Jespersen, for example, the vision
was of bartenders "who look like Hell's Angels, employees of the
WWE, cartoon characters, and/or wizards from the middle ages."' 1 3
The status quo, no matter the statutory directive, begins to look even
better when the alternative is painted as so vividly ghastly. In addition,
the employers have every incentive to resist what would be a transfer
of power from them to the employees. 114 Of course, obscured by the
spectacle of counter-cultural outlaws working the counters and cubi-
cles in workplaces across the nation is the reality that employers can
establish gender-neutral dress and appearance standards. If a particu-
lar employer does not like purple hair or large bracelets, the employer
could prohibit it in a gender-neutral manner. If it is not gender neu-
tral, the employer needs to show BFOQ status, a status that will re-
hair; clean trimmed nails v. nail length and color requirements; black leather
shoes v. black leather shoes. [ ] The requirement that women spend time and
money applying full facial makeup has no corresponding requirement for men,
making the "overall policy" more burdensome for the former than for the latter.
Id. at 1117 (KozinskiJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
112. See Korobkin, The Endowment Effect, supra note 36, at 1237-39 (discussing studies
where and noting that the "more difficult it is for individuals to compare two items in a
proposed trade, the larger the endowment effect tends to be").
113. Brief for Council for Employment Law Equity et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant-Appellee at 11, Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006) (No. 03-15045).
114. See Korobkin, The Endowment Effect, supra note 36, at 1267 ("A corollary to the
prediction that the endowment effect will entrench the regulatory status quo is that impos-
ing new or more stringent regulations on existing entitlements will tend to be disfavored
relative to regulating new entitlements.").
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quire the employer to articulate specific job needs that relate to
business. Jespersen's position would not yield workplaces that look
like the bar scene in Star Wars IV.115
These judicial interpretations display a reflexive activism that
blocks implementation of the statute. The courts are willing to allow
employers to force employees to conform to gender stereotypes after
the initial hiring process, limiting the protection of Title VII and im-
posing a bundle of disadvantages that are tied to the gendered prac-
tice. Without forcing legislators to debate the exceptions, or
employers to defend them, these exceptions grandfather in gender-
discriminatory practices. These practices perpetuate stereotypes but
are hidden from view, safe from attack, and free to wield their enor-
mous power behind the scenes.11 6
B. Categories and the Burdens of Appearance Standards
When courts claim that separate male and female dress and ap-
pearance codes have nothing to do with equal employment opportu-
nities, they ignore the problem of stereotypes. This oversight is not
115. Jespersen, on the other hand, is articulating a position that might not even have
much traction with either employees or females given generally prevailing stereotypes. Be-
cause we are entrenched in a world wedded to the practices we adopted before we awoke
to the problems of gender discrimination, many people, women included, wear make-up.
They may not mind because they are themselves affected by status quo bias. Cognitive bias
affects both males and females. See Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping:
Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense,
7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 401, 438 (2003) [hereinafter Williams, The Social Psychology of
Stereotyping]. The result is that Jespersen is on the field resisting the status quo with few
supporters in the stadium.
116. Sometimes the facts scream so loudly that they pierce through the wall of silent
stereotyping. For example, in one case the court was required to make assessments about
the impact of a "color coordinated" uniform for women versus "customary business attire"
for men. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029 (7th
Cir. 1979). Even probing a bit beneath the surface of the dual standards revealed the stere-
otyped reasoning of the employer, for example, to prevent "dress competition" and the
fear of fad choices at the expense of work-appropriate clothing. To its credit, when directly
confronted with this gender-based fear of fashion wars, the court pronounced the rule
discriminatory because it subjected female employees to a lower professional status and was
not justified by business necessity. Id. at 1032-33. Although not a very good rule, the
court's creation of the exception at least exposed it to enough information to see the
problem and move from the status quo. See also Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,
439 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding policy that did not allow female flight attendants to
wear glasses); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 603-06, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(finding a Title VII violation where female employee was required to wear a skimpy "Bicen-
tennial" costume that subjected her to lewd comments and sexual harassment because "it
[was] beyond dispute that the wearing of sexually revealing garments does not constitute a
[bona fide occupational qualification]").
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surprising given the subtle and complicated nature of the problem.
Because these stereotypes are generally reinforcements of the gender-
based status quo, they are never harmless and more often than not
asymmetrical in the burdens that they invoke. Yet Title VII developed
before we became more aware of the bias that lurked beneath our
conscious selves. 1 7 We now know that, in addition to the problem of
proving conscious overt discrimination and catching the clever inten-
tional discriminator, a large part of the problem in the area of race
and sex discrimination is how the mind makes implicit associations
with these categories. 118
For example, in the en banc Jespersen opinion, the court held the
requirement of make-up for women only was not gender discrimina-
tion under Title VII. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held thatJespersen
had failed to prove the make-up requirement (which men are not
bound by) places unequal burdens on women. 119 The court also re-
jected Jespersen's sex-stereotyping claim because she had not pro-
vided proof of a motive to stereotype women, and there was nothing
to suggest "that the policy was adopted to make women bartenders
conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women
should wear," or "the grooming standards would objectively inhibit a
woman's ability to do the job."12 0
The quest for motivation evidence misses the point on several
levels. First, the policy was intentionally discriminatory; it does not
matter what the motive is. If an employer sets different dress guide-
lines according to race, we would not ask the challenger to show that
117. See Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 19, at 1164-66.
118. See generally Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of "Affirmative Action", 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063, 1072-75 (2006) (proposing affirmative
programs "properly designed" to reduce implicit biases rather than to counteract the ef-
fects of past discrimination through set asides or preferences); Linda Hamilton Krieger &
Susan Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REv. 997 (2006) (arguing that judges need to understand and apply
accurate conceptions of social psychology in developing substantive legal theory); Charles
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious racial motivation-influenced by cul-
tural experience-fuels racial discrimination); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-
Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiay Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74
WASH. L. REv. 913, 915 (1999) ("[E]mpirical psychology studies ... show that intentional,
conscious discrimination is only a small fraction of workplace discrimination and that most
discriminatory acts result from unconscious stereotyping and cultural bias that never enter
into the decision maker's conscious mind-hence the outrage felt by defendants when
accused of intentional discrimination.").
119. See discussion supra notes 109-111.
120. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
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the motive was to stereotype. The facial nature of the policy satisfies
the intent requirement: that an employer may be oblivious to the ef-
fects is irrelevant. Second, the policy was likely the result of reflexive
discrimination. In our society, women are perceived as best seen in
make-up, and men are perceived as women if they wear make-up.
Hence, the Harrah's policy accords perfectly with prevailing stereo-
types and certainly with prevailing stereotypes in Reno, Nevada. 121
The court's opinion misunderstands stereotypes-they are categories
that we most often form reflexively, not easily found in the course of
the litigation discovery, but the result of implicit associations. Requir-
ing proof of intentional, conscious discrimination erects an effective
barrier to the claims and undermines the point of the statute.
The Supreme Court understood the concept when it held that
although females as a group live longer than males, employers could
not require individual females to contribute more to a pension
plan.122 Dismissing this statistically provable fact with almost a yawn,
the Court explained "[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an
insufficient reason for [discrimination]." 123 The Court lectured that
"[i]t is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the characteris-
tics of males or females." 124 When the Supreme Court interpreted Ti-
tle VII to cover same-sex sexual harassment, it was based on the
principle that the statute "not only covers 'terms' and 'conditions' [of
employment] in the narrow contractual sense, but 'evinces a congres-
sional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women in employment."' 1 25
The Supreme Court also recognized the concept of gender stere-
otyping and its coverage under Title VII in the early 1990s in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.126 Turned down for partnership, Ann Hopkins
121. See Appellee's Answering Brief at 26, Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc.,
392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), affd, 444 F.3d
1104 (9th Cir. 2006) ("It is axiomatic that in modem society many women wear make-up,
and that make-up is an accepted social norm."). It is naive to assume that the actually
smoking gun or circumstantial evidence of the smoking gun was available to produce. A
large employer like Harrah's is unlikely to make the rookie mistake of sending a memo
attesting to its discriminatory motive. Attorneys and legally astute managers ensure cleans-
ing of such evidence of discriminatory motivation if it exists.
122. L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
123. Id. at 709.
124. Id. at 707.
125. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Drilling Svcs, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (citing
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
126. 490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (1989).
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produced statements laced with language that pointed out the part-
ners' distress with her woeful failure to live up to gender norms. Feel-
ing free to spew their honest opinions, the partners wrote that they
considered her too "macho," that she needed to take a "course at
charm school" and to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry." 127 Hopkins hit the jackpot because the partners were in
touch with their real feelings, and, most importantly, they put it in
writing. The Supreme Court had a case where probing unconscious
stereotyping was not even necessary, and the Court was quick to out-
law stereotyping that was so clearly articulated:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate em-
ployees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group, for "[i] n forbidding employers to dis-
criminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress in-
tended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women .... "128
Price Waterhouse made the process too easy. The Court, recognizing sex
stereotyping when it got up and smacked the Court in the face, ex-
uded overconfidence: "It takes no special training to discern sex stere-
otyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring
,a course at charm school." 29 But it does take some training in cases
where the stereotyping is so well accepted that it eludes notice.
Courts are reluctant to credit social science testimony for a variety
of reasons. 130 Although in Price Waterhouse, the employee, Ann Hop-
kins, provided expert evidence on gender stereotyping, the Supreme
Court seemed reluctant to credit it.131 Nevertheless, the courts need
to grapple with this information, if only to be cognizant of the poten-
tial of their own internal biases, and self-correct when making deci-
sions. Moreover, the failure to consider developments in cognitive
127. Id. at 234-35.
128. Id. at 251.
129. Id. at 256.
130. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991); ROSEMARYJ. ERICKSON & RITAJ.
SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 17 (1998); Donald
N. Bersoff, Social Science Data and the Supreme Court: Lockhart as a Case in Point, 42 Am. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 52 (1987); D.L. Faigman &J. Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the
Law's Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REv. OF PSYCHOL. 631, 640 (2005); David L. Faigman, To Have
and Not Have: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J.
1005 (1989); Constance R. Lindman, Sources of Judicial Mistrust of Social Science Evidence: A
Comparison of Social Science and Jurisprudence, 64 IND. L.J. 755 (1989);J. Alexander Tanford,
The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137 (1990).
131. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989).
Winter 2007] DECEPTI'VE APPEARANCES
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
science leaves us ignorant of the way stereotyping may silently saturate
our thinking, therefore leading to decisions that reinforce a gendered
status quo.132 The Price Waterhouse court applied gender stereotyping
analysis in an easy case. It is up to all courts to explore the intricacies
of stereotyping beyond the obvious example in Price Waterhouse and to
apply the Price Waterhouse concept in cases where the stereotyping is
embedded in culturally accepted practices, as is the case in Jespersen
and other appearance cases.
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court dealt with a situation
where the employer obviously spoke disparagingly of a female em-
ployee who failed to conform to gender stereotypes. According to the
Jespersen en banc majority, "[i] mpermissible sex stereotyping was clear
[in Price Waterhouse] because the very traits that she was asked to hide
were the same traits considered praiseworthy in men."' 33 Of course,
Jespersen was asked to hide her face behind make-up, while lack of
make-up was considered the preferred attribute of men. If cosmetics
make the female bartender, perhaps the problem is sex stereotyp-
ing.134 In the en bancJespersen opinion, the court clearly carved out an
appearance and grooming policy exception to the Price Waterhouse
rule. The Jespersen court thus comes to the odd conclusion that if Price
Waterhouse had a formal written policy requiring its female employees
to wear make-up, it would not have been evidence of sex discrimina-
tion actionable under Title VII.
The Price Waterhouse and Jespersen cases both involved female
plaintiffs who were required to conform to gender norms or they
would be forced to lose their jobs. Harrah's requirements-that Jes-
persen's lips be made redder with lipstick, her cheekbones higher
with blush, and her eyelashes longer with mascara-are consistent
with gender-based customs. Make-up is intimately associated with the
female quest to be considered attractive. With some exceptions involv-
132. See generally Eugene Borgida, Corrie Hunt & Anita Kim, On the Use of Gender Stere-
otyping Research in Sex Discrimination Litigation, 13J.L. PoL'Y 613, 617 (2005) ("Gender is a
fundamental dimension of categorization. Once an individual is categorized as belonging
to a gender, the stereotypes of that gender may quickly come to the perceiver's mind, a
process known as stereotype activation. Once stereotypes are activated, they are then availa-
ble for the perceiver to apply in her thinking about and evaluation of the target person. It
is important to note that categorization, stereotype activation, and stereotype application
can all occur outside of the perceiver's awareness.").
133. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
134. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256 ("[If an employee's flawed 'interpersonal
skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the
employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.").
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ing the stage and screen, make-up is negatively associated with males.
Natural faces are the norm. Wearing it is often expected of women
and taboo for men. These rules are born of a time when women were
not entitled to equal rights under the law and they occupied a lower
social status, where their role was viewed in part as ornamental and
their worth often judged by their appearance. Appearance matters be-
cause it is a vivid signaling device for our brains and serves as a basis
for the opinions we hold-opinions that are often based on stereo-
typed viewpoints. 135
The claim that Harrah's is trying to project a "professional" ap-
pearance indicates that Harrah's wants to project an appearance that
a customer-well schooled in gender biases-will find comfortable.
Gender-neutral "professional" guidelines are fine, but gender-based
ones ignore the downsides of the automatic connections made and
require (at a minimum) a BFOQjustification. 136 Studies indicate that
the brain does not process gender in isolation but associates it with a
myriad of cross-references that reflect stereotyped views of women.1 37
When someone wears make-up, our minds do not compartmentalize
that fact and note it with detachment. Once tagged male or female,
the synapses begin snapping in our brain and a flood of implicit as-
135. See generally Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activa-
tion and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 509, 509-10
(1991). The danger inherent in gendered stereotypes is ironically revealed in Judge Pos-
ner's assertions that Title VII could not include appearance codes. Such a reading of Title
VII, he offered, would be a "strange extension" potentially requiring male workers to "wear
nail polish and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high heels." Hamm v.
Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003). Interestingly, Posner's
description of classically gendered notions of female attire contains within it a disparaging
account of those who typically inhabit such garb. Wearers of high heels "mince"-a man-
ner of walking defined by Webster's as "to walk with short steps in a prim affected man-
ner." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (11 th ed. 2003). Vain, shallow, and
"affected" people mince. Purposeful, thoughtful, and authoritative people stride, hasten,
or proceed. Mincing is not a respected way to move. If, as Posner suggests, people wearing
high heels mince, and, in the natural order of things, women wear high heels (while men
wear low), then the clothes-and the stereotypes they conjure-are indeed "making" the
man, and "unmaking" the woman.
136. Ironically, the casinos, other employers, and even the courts, understand the ster-
eotyping function of dress and appearance. See Kathryn Hausbeck, Who Puts the "Sin" in
"Sin City" Stories? Girls of Grit and Glitter in the City of Women, in THE GRIT BENEATH THE
GLITrER: TALES FROM THE REAL LAS VEGAS 233, 345-46 (2002) ("Sin City [Las Vegas] is not
a town rife with sex, but it is a city that systemically uses women's bodies to sell everything
other than sex.").
137. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping inJudg-
ments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 196-97 (1995).
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sociations pour out extinguishing any gender neutrality138 and influ-
encing our evaluations of persons and groups. 1 39 As others have
pointed out, seeing someone with make-up calls up a catalog of other
characteristics associated with females. 140 It permeates our thinking.
In addition to restricting women to narrow roles,14 1 merely dressing as
a stereotypical female may create an impression of less competence,
or at best it creates benevolent stereotypes that provide support for a
system of gender inequality. 142 Studies suggest that stereotypes may
138. See id. at 196-97; T. Andrew Poelhman et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Value (2005) (finding that implicit biases corre-
late with actual behaviors). See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006) (discussing implicit attitudes
and stereotypes); Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping, supra note 115 (discussing
studies).
139. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364 (D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske & G. Lindzey eds., 1998); Laurie A.
Rudman & Eugene Borgida, The Afterglow of Construct Accessibility: The Behavioral Conse-
quences of Priming Men to View Women as Sexual Objects, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
493, 511-13 (1995); Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 6
PSYCHOL. SCI. 136, 140-41 (1996).
140. See also Anke Rennenkampff, You Look So Feminine! When Did You Fail the Last Time?
Social Interaction Following The Think Manager-Think Male Stereotype, BRANDEIS GRAD. J.
(2004), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/gradjournal/2004/v.rennenkampff2004.pdf
(study results "show that applicants with a masculine physical appearance were promoted
more often and were perceived to have higher leadership competence than applicants with
a feminine physical appearance."). See generally Virginia Valian, The Cognitive Bases of Gender
Bias, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 1037, 1045 (1999) ("Experimental data demonstrate that we do not
see other people simply as people; we see them as males or females.").
141. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping, supra note 115, at 409 ("People and
jobs both are gendered, which gives stereotypes a profound effect on everyday interactions
in the workplace.").
142. For example, seeing women as warm and empathetic, good qualities, "may actu-
ally undercut perceptions of their competence." SeeJohn T. Jost & Aaron C. Kay, Exposure to
Benevolent Sexism and Complementary Gender Stereotypes: Consequences for Specific and Diffuse
Forms of SystemJustification, 88J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 498 (2005) (discussing the
role of stereotyping in maintaining support for the status quo and finding that
"[t]emporary activation of culturally available gender stereotypes does lead women-and
in some circumstances men-to embrace the system (with its attendant degree of inequal-
ity) more enthusiastically than they otherwise would." Id. at 508); see also Sandra Monk
Forsythe et al., Dress as an Influence on the Perceptions of Management Characteristics in Women,
13 HOME ECON. RES. J. 112 (1984); Barbara L. Frederickson & Tomi-Ann Roberts, Objectfi-
cation Theory: Toward Understanding Women's Lived Experiences and Mental Health Risks, 21
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 173, 179 (1997) ("Theories of socialization would predict that with
repeated exposure to the array of subtle external pressures to enhance physical beauty,
girls and women come to experience their efforts to improve their appearance as freely
chosen or even natural."); Joan Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a
Barrier to Gender Equality, 26 T.JEFFERSON L. REv. 1, 6 (2003) (noting problems of employer
"benevolent" stereotyping-"the employer policies men and women into traditionalist
bread-winner/housewife roles-clearly an inappropriate role for an employer to play").
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harm our performance by just being "in the air,"'143 as part of our
environment. Such stereotypes shape our actions, cabin our ability to
make counter associations, and contribute to prejudicial attitudes.' 44
Gender stereotypes are a bundle of favorable and unfavorable quali-
ties.1 45 Although a woman in make-up might evoke an initial flattering
stereotype, the complementary stereotype might be one undercutting
a perception of job competence. 46 Moreover, once the courts allow
gender-based policies to go unexamined, the burden of biases is rein-
forced, 47 and as a result, there is a tendency to ignore information
that is inconsistent with the stereotypes.' 48 Significantly, most of this
processing goes on behind the scenes in our minds and there are no
observable symptoms, unlike those produced by viruses or spoiled
food. 149
C. Playing the Frame Game-the Make-up Edition
How we ask a question can determine the answer.' 50 Remember,
that in considering a risky medical procedure, how your doctor
phrases the five year survival statistics-whether she notes that ten per-
cent are dead or says that ninety percent are alive-makes a differ-
ence in the answers given.' 5 ' The frame affects the answer because it
provides the mental structure that our brain uses to connect to other
ideas. In the first example, our brain connects to the risk of death, not
a positive frame when you undergo a medical procedure. In the sec-
ond example, our brain connects to the idea of survival, which is far
more appealing. Once the brain has the frame highlighted, it is hard
143. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997); see alsoJost & Kay, supra note 142, at 498
("Social stereotypes are indeed powerful environmental stimuli that do not depend on
conscious, personal endorsement for their effects to be palpable.").
144. Ad van Kippenberg & Ap Dijksterhuis, A Posteriori Stereotype Activation: The Preserva-
tion of Stereotypes Through Memory Distortion, 14 Soc. COGNITION 21, 46-48 (1996).
145. SeeJost & Kay, supra note 142, at 499.
146. Id. at 498.
147. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified
Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 926-37 (1999).
148. Id.
149. See Wilson & Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction, supra note 31, at
116, 121 ("Although people cannot observe rhinoviruses, a stuffed-up nose tells them they
have a cold. If one is wondering whether a gallon of milk is fresh or spoiled, a quick whiff
will reveal the answer. There are seldom such observable symptoms, such as smell, temper-
ature, or physical appearance, indicating that a human judgment is contaminated. As a
result, people are often unaware that their judgment is 'spoiled,' in Jacoby and Kelley's
(1987) terms. Human judgments-even very bad ones-do not smell.").
150. See discussion supra Part I.C.
151. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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for our mind to rid itself of the image; it infects your thinking about
the whole issue. Whether you have that operation may depend on how
the doctor asked the question more than the cold hard statistics of
survival and death rates.
Framing plays a role in judicial decisions because lawyers under-
stand the value of framing. In Jespersen, for example, Harrah's, wise to
the value of framing its appearance polices in a neutral manner, de-
veloped a "Personal Best" policy.1 52 Stated in impartial terms, the idea
is that a good employee is an employee with good grooming. Having
hooked into this clean and wholesomely neutral idea, the policy then
diverges into two standards of Barbie and Ken grooming. 153 Women
must engage in daily application of foundation, blush, mascara, and
lipstick in accord with a specially created face template, keeping their
hair "teased, curled, or styled" while men are tasked with the monthly
chore of keeping their hair and nails short. 154
Here, the frame is critical to the court's opinion because the
frame sets the stage for the result. Now, the court could have reacted
to the "Personal Best" policy in at least two ways. It could use a frame
that highlighted: (1) the different male and female grooming stan-
dards that reflected gender stereotypes; or (2) the "equality" of just
having grooming standards generally for males and females. The
problem with the second frame is that it avoids addressing the ine-
quality of the individual standards. The Ninth Circuit bought Har-
rah's frame, claiming that equality triumphed by highlighting that
grooming standards existed for both males and females. 155 Pulling
152. SeeDeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1987) (menjogging
shirtless); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring men to
wear ties); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (men for-
bidden from having long hair, but not women); Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920 (8th Cir.
1973) (marine reservists wearing wigs); Lansdale v. TylerJunior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th
Cir. 1972) (short hair on men); State v. Vogt, 342 N.J. Super. 368 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (men may appear topless, women not so much).
153. A previous challenge to a casino requirement of a Barbie doll image was rejected
under Title VII. Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 913-14 (D. Nev. 1993).
154. All Beverage Service Personnel, in addition to being friendly, polite, courte-
ous and responsive to our customer's needs, must possess the ability to physically
perform the essential factors of the job as set forth in the standard job descrip-
tions. They must be well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned,
and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified uni-
form. Additional factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, hair-
styles, overall body contour, and degree of comfort the employee projects while
wearing the uniform.
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
155. Id. at 1106.
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back the camera to this wide-angle shot obscures and minimizes the
inequities.
Consider the following statements from the majority en banc
opinion, which served to frame the case. Each focuses on the policy as
fair and balanced, while ignoring the policy's distinct dissimilar and
lopsided gender-based requirements:
In contrast [to a case involving different weight requirements for
men and women], this case involves an appearance policy that applied
to both male and female bartenders, and was aimed at creating a profes-
sional and very similar look for all of them. All bartenders wore the same
uniform. The policy only differentiated as to grooming
standards .... 156
This case stands in marked contrast [to the case applying different
weight policies to male and female employees], for here we deal
with requirements that, on their face, are not more onerous for one
gender than the other.... 1
57
While [Harrah's] individual requirements differ according to gen-
der, none on its face places a greater burden on one gender than the
other... 158
Harrah's "Personal Best" policy is very different [from Price
Waterhouse]. The policy does not single outJespersen. It applies to
all bartenders, male and female. It requires all of the bartenders to
wear exactly the same uniforms while interacting with the public in
the context of the entertainment industry. It is for the most part
unisex, from the black tie to the non-skid shoes .... 159
This case is essentially a challenge to one small part of what is an
overall apparel, appearance, and grooming policy that applies largely
the same requirements to both men and women. 
160
All these frames have the ninety-six percent fat-free problem.
They focus on the equality of the standards when they differ by four
percent. Despite creative framing, the bartenders, although perform-
ing the exact same job, were not required to wear the same uniform.
Female bartenders were required specifically to conform to feminine
appearance stereotypes by wearing make-up and male bartenders
were required to conform to male appearance stereotypes by not
wearing make-up. These rules did not level the playing field, as the
court's language attempts to imply, but transformed ajob that has no
specific gender requirements (pouring drinks and dealing with cus-
tomers) by adding a requirement that the employee conform to gen-
156. Id. at 1109 (emphasis added).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 1111-12 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 1109-13 (emphasis added).
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der norms. Two equally adept bartenders, one male and one female,
will sink or swim solely upon their ability to conform to the make-up
requirement.
The framing game is easy to play, of course, and certainly the
clever understand and play the game. Ultimately, it is a word game
that preys on cognitive biases, rather than analytical clarity. At the end
of the day, if equality is simply a matter of creative framing, for exam-
ple, "separate but equal," sloganeering replaces analysis, and arbitrary
results become the rule. 161
Judges should take care to avoid deceptive framing, concentrat-
ing more on logic and reasoning and less on selling the result through
creative word play that does not further the intellectual enterprise. 62
When crafting the question becomes the real work-so the desired
results automatically follow-it can lead to opinions that are intellec-
tually hollow and easily manipulated. In the appearance cases, troub-
led by upsetting the gendered status quo, the courts have struggled to
come to the desired result through a variety of methods. Framing ine-
quality as a case of "unequal burdens" is one tack, but it is more gim-
mick than sophisticated analysis and thus more disheartening than
convincing.
Conclusion
The courts, cemented to a status quo of gendered appearances,
have creatively devised theories to sidestep Title VII's anti-discrimina-
tion directive. When interpreting anti-discrimination legislation such
as Title VII, courts must be conscious of the reflexive drive to resist
the changes demanded by the legislation. The inequities in appear-
161. The federal district court inJespersen played the game as well, noting that the re-
quirement that women only wear make-up was as much of a burden on men who could not
wear make-up. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (D.
Nev. 2002), 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'ggranted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), affd,
444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). At one level, there is the perfect symmetry that her male
counterpart cannot wear make-up, and would lose if they chose to challenge that require-
ment. This "separate but equal" concept is rejected in race cases, but still popular in gen-
der and sexual orientation cases, and builds on the notion that the inherent biological
differences between male and female must find accommodation in the law. One problem,
of course, is that the limited exception swallows the rule, as the courts see cultural expres-
sions as biological imperatives. Moreover, framing skills allow equality to be spun out of
inequality-the majority of men do not in fact long to wear lipstick, high heels, or skimpy
uniforms and the courts are disingenuous for suggesting to the contrary.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59. See also Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of
One's Own, 16 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8-11 (2004) (noting the framing issue in the area of
substantive due process claims).
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ance policies are not trivial, but rather reinforce stereotypes that mag-
nify the distinctions between genders. Requiring employees to dress
and play their respective gender roles, without employer justification,
sets in motion deliberate and repetitive reinforcement of biased gen-
der roles. These small biases trigger larger ones, and added to their
self-perpetuating nature, help grind out the substantial distinctions
between genders over time. Artfully selling the status quo in judicial
opinions through framing strategies is a poor substitute for a thought-
ful analysis of the complex issues raised by Title VII specifically and
gender inequality generally.
When trying to change the rules of the gender game, our own
minds are our most elusive and hardy opponents. Generally, courts
must become more attuned to issues of cognitive bias. Our decision-
making processes are flawed, but awareness of the problem and cor-
rective action will increase our chances of succeeding in the quest for
implementing gender equality.
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